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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, a minor tempest has been raging over the Delaware Arbitration 
Program, which attempts to marry one of America’s premier business courts to the 
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fundamentally more private consensual adjudicative alternative, binding 
arbitration.1  At a time when commercial parties face potentially long delays in 
underfunded courts, but harbor mixed views about arbitration, Delaware’s unique 
concoction ostensibly offers a veritable trifecta of procedural advantages. These 
include: (1) a first-rate adjudicator practiced at applying the law to complex factual 
scenarios, (2) efficient case management and short cycle time and, above all, (3) a 
proceeding cloaked in secrecy.  For the State of Delaware, the Program represents 
yet another enticement to businesses to select Delaware as the forum of choice, and 
even suggests the jurisdiction’s pretensions as a potential competitor in the global 
arbitration sweepstakes.  For judges sitting in Delaware’s Court of Chancery, 
moreover, it is a sterling entrée into a post-judicial career as an arbitrator and 
mediator—the retirement plan du jour for American judges.2   
On the other hand, the Delaware Arbitration Program’s ambitious 
intermingling of public and private forums brings into play the longstanding tug-
of-war between “the traditional party-centered view of civil litigation as a public 
service for private dispute resolution and the often conflicting perception of courts 
as ‘institutions expressive of and accountable to the public.’”3  The Program 
triggered a constitutional challenge based on third parties’ right of access to court 
proceedings.  The case was heard by a judge of the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation, who ruled that arbitration 
proceedings heard before sitting judges of the Delaware Chancery Court were 
“essentially” non-jury civil trials and thus were subject to public access.4 
The decision has been appealed to the Third Circuit.  The case raises 
legitimate questions about the appropriateness of structuring a program in which 
sitting judges serve as arbitrators and preside over a procedure that is effectively 
shielded from public view.  It also implicates issues regarding the use of public 
resources in ostensibly private disputes, and even the way our justice system is 
                                                                          
* William H. Webster Chair in Dispute Resolution and Professor of Law; Academic Director, Straus 
Institute for Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine University School of Law.  The author wishes to thank 
Matthew Diffenderfer, Adam Klapova and the organizers of the Pepperdine Journal of Business, 
Entrepreneurship & the Law’s Fall, 2012 Symposium “Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the 
Future Holds for Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals,” Oct. 30, 2012.  Thanks 
also to Hsuan (Valerie) Li and Jessica Tyndall, Pepperdine University School of Law Class of 2014, for 
their background research for this article.  
 Matthew Diffenderfer, Adam Klapova and the organizers of the Pepperdine Journal of Business, 
Entrepreneurship & the Law’s Fall 2012 Symposium “Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the 
Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals,” Oct. 30, 2012.  
Thanks also to Hsuan (Valerie) Li and Jessica Tyndall, Pepperdine University School of Law Class of 
2014, for their background research for this article.  
1 The program was “intended to preserve Delaware’s pre-eminence in offering cost-effective 
options for resolving disputes, particularly those involving commercial, corporate, and technology 
matters.”  Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012) (quoting H.R. 
49, 145th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009)).   
2 See Stephanie Francis Cahill, Judge-to-Arbitrator Route Is Targeted: California Bill Would Limit 
Jumping From Bench to Private Dispute Firms, 1 NO. 12 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 4 (2002). 
3 Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of 
Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 287 (1999) (quoting Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? 
Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the 
Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1527 (1994)).   
4 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 494.  The decision was appealed to the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals.    
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funded.  
 Part II of this article explores the factors that provided the impetus for the 
Delaware Arbitration Program and describes its features.  Part III describes the 
constitutional challenge, the arguments by opponents and proponents of the 
Program, and the district court ruling striking down the Program.  Part IV analyzes 
the arguments for and against upholding the district court’s determination, along 
with underlying evidence and other considerations, leading to the conclusion that 
the district court’s decision was well-founded.  
II. IMPETUS FOR, FEATURES OF THE DELAWARE PROGRAM 
A. Courts in Crisis 2.0 
Litigation entails big costs and risks to businesses.  Although almost ninety-
nine percent of cases settle before trial,5 litigation represents a substantial portion 
of corporate legal budgets.6  More than $21 billion is spent annually on litigation 
here in the United States, and, judging by recent responses to Fulbright & 
Jaworski’s annual surveys of corporate counsel, the number of U.S.-based 
companies spending more than a million dollars per year on litigation is above fifty 
percent, and growing.7   
The costs and risks of litigation are exacerbated by the current crisis in our 
court system, as most states have made substantial cuts in judicial funding.8  The 
State of California has delayed appointing judges,9 and there have been massive 
layoffs in other court systems.10  For a variety of reasons, federal judicial 
                                                                          
5 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004). 
6 The median is approximately 29%.  Second Annual Fulbright’s Litigation Trends Survey: 
Findings, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P. (2005), at 13, http://www.fulbright.com/mediaroom/files/ 
FJ0536-US-V13.pdf. 
7 Fulbright’s Litigation Trends Survey: A Little Less Litigation; More Regulation, FULBRIGHT & 
JAWORSKI L.L.P. (2011), http://www.fulbright.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=news.detail&article_ 
id=9902&site_id=286 (“U.S. companies report a median spend of $1.4 million compared to $1 million 
last year.”). 
8 See John Schwartz, Critics Say Budget Cuts for Courts Risk Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/us/budget-cuts-for-state-courts-risk-rights-critics-
say.html?pagewanted=all (“42 states have reduced their judicial budgets in the previous three fiscal 
years, with cuts in some jurisdictions totaling more than 12 percent.”); Maura Dolan and Victoria Kim, 
Budget Cuts to Worsen California Court Delays, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 20, 2011), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/20/local/la-me-0720-court-cuts-20110720 (California has had a 
thirty percent reduction in the past three years). 
9 See Analysis of the 2008-09 Budget Bill: Criminal Justice, Judicial Branch (0250), LEGISLATIVE 
ANALYST’S OFFICE (2008), http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_2008/crim_justice/cj_anl08003.aspx#zzee 
_link_1_1202846137 (“Delays by the Governor in appointing the first 50 judges established in 2006–07 
resulted in savings of nearly $3 million—ten positions, as of the time this analysis was prepared, still 
were not filled.”). 
10 E.g., Robert Gavin, State Court Layoffs Hits 17 in Capital Region as CSEA President Decries 
Cuts, TIMES UNION (May 18, 2011), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/State-court-layoffs-hit-
17-in-Capital-Region-as-1385047.php (367 employees laid off from New York state court system in 
2011); Our View: Court System’s Troubles, GADSDEN TIMES (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.gadsdentimes.com/article/20130219/NEWS/130219798?p=1&tc=pg (Chief Justice Roy 
Moore of the Supreme Court of Alabama predicts a twenty-five percent increase in layoffs in addition 
to the twelve percent that has already been cut in recent years). 
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appointments have also been held up,11 and the deluge of criminal cases on the 
federal docket, coupled with the Speedy Trial Act, has meant even mega-cases like 
the Google/Oracle dispute have taken a back seat when it comes to scheduling.12 
Not long ago, the American College of Trial Lawyers co-sponsored a study 
of U.S. litigation that expressed significant concerns regarding high costs and 
delays in obtaining discovery and getting to trial.13  The ACTL study encouraged 
efforts to move beyond the present “one-size-fits-all” procedural framework and 
promote a variety of process choices tailored to different kinds of cases.14  The 
authors, of course, had in mind the development of options within the litigation 
system.  For many corporate counsel, however, binding arbitration holds the 
greatest potential as a vehicle for accommodating choice-based processes.15  
B. Going for the Arbitration Trifecta? 
Some decades ago, binding arbitration was the most popular alternative for 
resolution of business disputes that could not be settled.16  Arbitrating parties 
availed themselves of a wide variety of procedural options, including non-
lawyered procedures,17 tailored to many different kinds of commercial disputes.  
Among other things, studies showed that most users believed arbitration promoted 
faster resolution and cost-savings.18   
Even after leading businesses and corporate counsel began experimenting 
with mediation and a variety of other approaches aimed at managing and resolving 
conflict, arbitration remained a widely-used process choice,19 encouraged by a 
series of Supreme Court decisions paving the way for the expansion of arbitration 
across virtually the entire spectrum of civil actions, including statute-based 
                                                                          
11 See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority 
Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L. J. 1423, 1448 n.157 (2008) (growing partisanship has 
worsened the appointment process); Charlie Savage, Obama Lags on Judicial Picks, Limiting His Mark 
on Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/us/politics/obama-lags-
on-filling-seats-in-the-judiciary.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (escalating partisan warfare has delayed 
“even uncontroversial picks who would have been quickly approved in the past.”). 
12 Karen Gullo and Pamela MacLean, Oracle Trial with Google Over Java Patents is Postponed, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-19/oracle-trial-
with-google-over-java-patents-may-be-delayed-u-s-judge-says.html. 
13 FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK 
FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
2 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/ 
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008. 
14 Id. at 4. 
15 Thomas J. Stipanowich & Ryan J. Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of 
Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations 45, HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221471. 
16 Id. at 4–5.     
17 Some forms of arbitration were pure business tribunals, with no advocacy or adjudicative role 
for legal counsel.  See generally Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 
859 (1961) (discussing problem of attorney participation in arbitration process which causes inadequacy 
and delay).  See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L. REV. 425, 
434 n.42 (1987), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2061822 (some trade associations forbade 
attorney involvement in arbitration process). 
18 Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 4.    
19 Id. at 27 (Chart E shows that 83% of Fortune 1,000 companies have used arbitration in the prior 
three years to 2011). 
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causes.20  Many companies see arbitration as a way of saving time and money, 
ensuring a more satisfactory process, and limiting the extent of discovery.21  It is 
also a mechanism for preserving privacy and confidentiality.22  Because 
companies’ core assets are largely represented by intellectual property and other 
proprietary information, they often take great pains to render information safe from 
third parties.23  Cloaking proceedings in privacy may also be a way of keeping the 
lid on other facts that might prove embarrassing—or worse.   
Some legal advocates, however, feel a lingering discomfort with arbitration 
as they know (or perceive) it.  In a recent survey of Fortune 1,000 corporate 
counsel, fully half of those responding said that their company was disinclined to 
use arbitration in the future.24  Although there are always going to be situations 
where litigation is generally preferable,25 a few abiding concerns are cited as 
barriers to choosing arbitration.  Heading the list were limitations on judicial 
review of arbitration awards, the concern that arbitrators may not follow the law, 
the perception that arbitrators tend to compromise, and lack of confidence in 
neutrals.26  Moreover, a growing number of corporate counsel viewed high cost as 
a barrier to the use of arbitration;27 this result is resonant with recent broadly 
expressed concerns about growing costs and inefficiencies in commercial 
arbitration.28 
In light of all of the foregoing, a form of arbitration that ensures parties a 
high degree of confidentiality coupled with a fair measure of predictability (in 
terms of a result that is rational and conforms to the law) and an assurance of 
economy and efficiency would provide a highly desirable process—a veritable 
arbitration trifecta. 
Enter the Delaware Arbitration Program, established by a 2009 statute29 and 
implemented by Chancery Court Rules.30  The legislation provides that “[t]he 
Court of Chancery shall have the power to arbitrate business disputes when the 
parties request a member of the Court of Chancery, or such other person as may be 
                                                                          
20 Id. at 47; JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 612 (2d 
ed. 2010). 
21 Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 43. 
22 Id. at 43. 
23 See THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH & PETER H. KASKELL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: 
SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS, Ch. 6 (2001) (discussing confidentiality in arbitration 
and measures for protecting trade secrets and other sensitive information). 
24 Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 36 (Table N shows that 49.9% of respondents would 
be unlikely or very unlikely to use arbitration for corporate/commercial disputes). 
25 One example would probably be the acquisition of a public company by a strategic buyer.  See 
James Griffin, Address at the Pepperdine University Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship, and the 
Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds For Large Business 
Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012). 
26 Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 37.  Compare similar results from a recent RAND 
study.  See DOUGLAS SHONTZ ET AL., BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 
PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL (Rand Institute for Civil Justice Report 2011).   
27 Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 37 (discussing Rand Report and earlier Fortune 1,000 
survey).  
28 THE COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS: PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS, COST-
EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1–3 (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al., eds. 2010). 
29 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a) (West 2013). 
30 DEL. CH. CT. R. 96–98. 
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authorized under rules of the Court, to arbitrate a dispute.”31  In order to avail 
themselves of this provision, parties must consent to the process, at least one party 
must be a “business entity” formed or organized under the laws of Delaware or 
have its principal place of business in Delaware, no party can be a “consumer,”32 
and claims for monetary damages must be at least $1,000,000.33   
The most notable feature of the Delaware Arbitration Program is 
confidentiality, for which the program affords special protections.  The legislation 
provides that “[a]rbitration proceedings shall be considered confidential and not of 
public record until such time, if any, as the proceedings are the subject of an 
appeal.”34  Such appeal would be to the Delaware Supreme Court in the form of an 
“application to vacate, stay, or enforce an order of the Court of Chancery issued in 
an arbitration proceeding.”35  The Supreme Court is to “exercise its authority in 
conformity with the Federal Arbitration Act, and such general principles of law 
and equity as are not inconsistent with that Act.”36  In line with Supreme Court 
interpretations, application of FAA standards would make review of awards for 
errors of fact or law extremely unlikely.37 
The implementing Chancery Court Rules strongly reinforce the element of 
confidentiality in several ways, cloaking all aspects of the entire arbitration 
procedure in secrecy.  First of all, “[P]etition[s] [for arbitration] and any supporting 
documents are considered confidential and not of public record until such time, if 
any, as the proceedings are the subject of an appeal,” and are therefore not to be 
included in the Chancery Court’s public docketing system.38  Furthermore, state 
the rules,  
[a]rbitration hearings are private proceedings such that only parties and their 
representatives may attend, unless all parties agree otherwise. . . . Any 
communication made in or in connection with the arbitration that relates to any 
                                                                          
31 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(a).   
32 This is a significant, well-considered and laudable limitation on the Program. While 
confidentiality is often a prized element of business-to-business arbitration, its use in arbitration in the 
context of adhesion contracts, notably those involving individual employees and consumers of goods 
and services, may give rise to tangible concerns about fairness because confidentiality requirements 
often operate to the relative detriment of individuals.  See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy 
Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1121, 1228-1253 (2006); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The 
Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote 
Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 
985, 1047, 1056 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2004543.  A 
number of courts have found broad confidentiality clauses in adhesion contracts to be unconscionable 
and therefore unenforceable.  See Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2010); 
Ting v. Ting, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2003); Sprague v. Household Int’l, 473 F. Supp. 2d 
966, 974–75 (W.D. Mo. 2005); McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 858–59 (Wash. 2008); Schnuerle 
v. Insight Commc’ns Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 577–78 (Ky. 2012).  But see Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. 
v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2004) (confidentiality provision did not 
render clause unconscionable); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., IV, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 279–80 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (same). 
33 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b). 
34 Id.  
35 Id. § 349(c). 
36 Id.    
37 Id. § 349(b). 
38 DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(a)(4); Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 496 (D. Del. 
2012). 
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controversy being arbitrated, whether made to the Arbitrator or a party, or to any 
person if made at an arbitration hearing, is confidential.39   
This expansive language of confidentiality applying to all participants and all 
communications appears to go well beyond standard arbitration procedures, which 
typically give general direction to arbitrators and administrative organizations to 
“maintain” the privacy of the proceedings.40  Under the circumstances, one 
wonders if the provisions were modeled in part on procedures for mediation or 
other settlement-oriented ADR processes!41 
The arbitrator’s final award is automatically transformed into a judgment of 
the Court of Chancery42—a decree which is not of public record unless and until it 
is the subject of a motion to the Supreme Court of Delaware.43  Although awards-
cum-judgments are available on the LexisNexis File & Serve system under the 
heading of “arbitration judgments,” no case or party information is included.44  In 
this way, it appears, the authors of the Delaware program sought to create a 
judicially administered version of arbitration which would effectively function sub 
rosa save in those situations where appeal is taken to the Supreme Court.   
Delaware’s arbitration model also aims to address businesses’ concern that 
arbitrators, whose decisions (awards) are not typically reviewable on the merits, 
                                                                          
39 DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(b). 
40 R-23. Attendance at Hearings  
The arbitrator and the AAA shall maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the 
law provides to the contrary.  Any person having a direct interest in the 
arbitration is entitled to attend hearings.  The arbitrator shall otherwise have the 
power to require the exclusion of any witness, other than a party or other 
essential person, during the testimony of any other witness.  It shall be 
discretionary with the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the attendance of 
any other person other than a party and its representatives.  
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures (Including Procedures for Large, Complex 
Commercial Disputes), AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, (Jun. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules/rulesdetail?doc=ADRSTG_004130&_afrLoop=7191437
01526582&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=q935mgajk_44#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dq935m
gajk_44%26_afrLoop%3D719143701526582%26doc%3DADRSTG_004130%26_afrWindowMode%3
D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dq935mgajk_96. 
Rule 26. Confidentiality and Privacy  
(a) JAMS and the Arbitrator shall maintain the confidential nature of the 
Arbitration proceeding and the Award, including the Hearing, except as 
necessary in connection with a judicial challenge to or enforcement of an Award, 
or unless otherwise required by law or judicial decision.  
(b) The Arbitrator may issue orders to protect the confidentiality of proprietary 
information, trade secrets or other sensitive information.  
(c) Subject to the discretion of the Arbitrator or agreement of the Parties, any 
person having a direct interest in the Arbitration may attend the Arbitration 
Hearing. The Arbitrator may exclude any non-Party from any part of a Hearing. 
JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION 
SERVICES, INC., (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-
Rules/JAMS_comprehensive_arbitration_rules-2010.pdf. 
41 Perhaps not coincidentally, the rules provide for the judge/arbitrator to act as mediator upon 
request of the parties.  DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(d).  Although by no means unprecedented, provisions for 
“med/arb” are unusual in U.S. practice.  See STIPANOWICH & KASKELL, supra note 23, at 20–21.   
42 “Upon the granting of a final award, a final judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity 
therewith and be enforced as any other judgment or decree.”  DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(f)(3). 
43 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(c). 
44 See Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 497 (D. Del. 2012). 
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might not make decisions in accordance with legal principles and might engage in 
unsuitable compromise.45  Here, of course, a sitting judge would be making the 
decision.  In the words of Chief Justice Myron Steele of the Delaware Supreme 
Court,  
[Business parties] want a competent resolution within an expeditious period of 
time.  And they want some predictability of outcome from the process.  [In the 
Delaware Program y]ou get an arbitrator who’s knowledgeable about the current 
state of the law and who’s accustomed to apply the law.  It’s not ‘catch as catch 
can’ from a list that the parties pare down, hoping to get one or three to sit as 
arbitrators in the case.46 
For cautious, control-minded counsel, the ability to consult a would-be 
decision-maker’s recent published opinions is likely to be perceived as a 
significant benefit;47 pertinent knowledge and experience is also critical.48   
A third and growing concern of businesses has to do with the cost and time 
associated with adjudication—the fear that arbitration, like litigation, will turn into 
costly and lengthy procedural quagmire.49  Here again, proponents assert that the 
Delaware Program offers unique advantages, since Delaware Chancery judges are 
noted for their ability to handle cases quickly and efficiently.  Justice Steele 
strongly suggests that, contrary to the broad run of journeyman arbitrators, 
Chancery judges are incentivized to get the hearing done quickly: “You get an 
arbitrator with no personal, financial interest in [prolonging the arbitration] . . . . 
members of the Court of Chancery get paid the same, whether they resolve this 
case in 3 days or 90 days.”50  Among Chancery judges, he points out, efficient 
habits of mind are reinforced by a Chancery Court Rule to the effect that the 
arbitration hearing “generally will occur no later than 90 days following receipt of 
the petition [for arbitration].”51 
For Delaware, the Arbitration Program is an opportunity to enhance its 
reputation as the friendliest forum for business in the United States, and to derive 
at least some additional recompense from parties for the services of public 
judges.52  A more lucrative result may proceed from an increase in charter fees 
                                                                          
45 Myron T. Steele, Chief Justice, Del. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the Journal of 
Business, Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the 
Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J. 
BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375. 
46 Id. 
47 “[I]t really is a draw where you actually have folks who have published opinions that you can 
look at and have a sense of predictability.”  Katherine Blair, Partner, K & L Gates, Keynote Address at 
the Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship, & the Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door 
Arbitration: What the Future Holds For Large Business Disputes and How It Will Affect M&A Deals 
(Oct. 30, 2012), in 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 382 
48 See Distinguished Visiting Practitioner James Griffin, Address at the Journal of Business, 
Entrepreneurship, and & Law Symposium: Delaware’s Closed Door Arbitration: What the Future Holds 
for Large Business Disputes and How it Will Affect M&A Deals (Oct. 30, 2012), in 6. J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 375, 383 (expressing confidence in knowledge of Court of Chancery judges 
regarding how M&A deals are done).    
49 See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 15, at 38, 46–47. 
50 Steele, supra note 45, at 381. 
51 See DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(e). 
52 Use of the Program entails a $12,000 filing fee and $6,000 per day for the service.  Brian Farkas, 
2013 IN QUEST OF THE ARBITRATION TRIFECTA 357 
 
from businesses seeking to avail themselves of the new Program by incorporating 
in Delaware.53  And for Court of Chancery judges, there is the ability to augment 
their resumes with expertise in another form of adjudication and enhance their 
credentials for a post-judicial future as private dispute resolvers.54  
 But when all is said and done, the success of the Program depends on the 
buy-in of corporations, and dispute resolution tends to be very low on the list of 
priorities in corporate deal-making.55  In the words of a Los Angeles M&A 
attorney, “It’s last on the list, if anything.  It’s a throw-in.”56  Moreover, 
corporations are notoriously cautious about innovating when it comes to 
experimenting with new and untried methods of resolving business disputes.  As 
the M&A lawyer puts it, her clients “like to cross the street with a bunch of 
folks.”57 
Given the native caution of corporations and counsel respecting new 
concepts and new options, the last thing the Delaware Arbitration Program needed 
was a well-publicized challenge to its constitutionality.  Enter an organization 
styling itself the Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc.  
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 
In 2010, the Delaware Coalition for Open Government, a nonprofit 
organization, challenged the Delaware Arbitration Program by means of a suit 
against the five judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery.58  The Coalition 
contended that the defendants, “under color of State law, constitute[d] an unlawful 
deprivation of the public’s right of access to trials in violation of the First 
Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.”59  “Although the statute and rules call the procedure 
arbitration,” the Coalition argued, “it is really litigation under another name,”60 
except for the fact that it was conducted “behind closed doors instead of in open 
court.”61  Citing Supreme Court decisions and other precedents recognizing the 
right of the public and press to attend judicial proceedings, both civil and criminal, 
and to review documents filed in court,62 the complaint sought to have the relevant 
                                                                          
Sitting Judges as Arbitrators: The Delaware Experiment, LAW STUDENT CONNECTION, (May 16, 2012, 
1:54pm), available at http://nysbar.com/blogs/lawstudentconnection/2012/05/sitting_judges_as_ 
arbitrators_.html. 
53 See Steele, supra note 45, at 392.    
54 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation”, 7 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 405 (2009), available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=1372291 [hereinafter Arbitration and Choice]. 
55 Id. at 408.   
56 Katherine Blair, supra note 47, at 386. 
57 Id.  
58 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 493 (D. Del. 2012). 
59 Complaint at 5, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (No. 11:11CV01015), 2011 WL 
5042086. 
60 Id. at 4. 
61 Id. 
62 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (holding the public and press 
have a right to attend criminal trials); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 
1984) (holding the public and press have the right to attend civil trials); N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002) (same). 
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legislation and implementing Chancery Rules declared unconstitutional and to 
enjoin the defendant judges from conducting non-public arbitration proceedings 
under the program.63   
An amicus curiae brief filed by various media outlets in support of the 
complaint emphasized the press’ “strong interest in upholding the public’s right to 
access, monitor and report on the proceedings of this nation’s court system.”64  The 
brief elucidated the various benefits of open access to court proceedings, including 
the disclosure of information to the public, sufficient to “alert consumers to 
potential dangers posed by products . . .” and the ability of the public to monitor 
courts’ conduct.65  It raised concerns about the impact of closed proceedings on the 
rights of concerned third party parties, including shareholders of arbitrating 
corporations.66  The brief asserted that  
[p]arties concerned about the confidentiality of information . . . related to private 
arbitration do not have to consent to the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court.  But 
when they do invoke the authority of a publicly funded court, the rules governing 
confidentiality change, and a presumption in favor of openness attaches to the 
records at issue.67  
By way of example, the brief cited Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Rite 
Aid Corp.,68 in which a court considering competing motions to vacate or to 
confirm an arbitration award declined to maintain the entire record of arbitration 
proceedings under seal in light of, among other things, “the common law 
presumption of public access” to court proceedings.69   
In support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings, the defendants filed 
a joint brief founded on the premise that in order to establish a right of access to 
governmental proceedings, the plaintiff was required to plead and prove that the 
type of proceeding involved has historically been accessible to the press and 
public, and that “public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of 
the proceeding, including consideration of whether public access impairs the 
public good.”70  The brief was replete with citations supporting the longstanding 
recognition of the inherent privacy of arbitration proceedings.71  It alluded to the 
                                                                          
63 Complaint, supra note 59, at 5. 
64 Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press and Five News 
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ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct,72 which acknowledges that judges may 
“‘act as an arbitrator . . .’ when ‘expressly authorized by law.’”73  It also drew 
attention to the employment of court-annexed arbitration in federal district court 
ADR programs74 and provisions of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 
199875 that list voluntary arbitration (subject to a right of trial de novo) among 
ADR options available to Federal courts, and related provisions for confidentiality 
of ADR proceedings.76  The defendants asserted that allowing public access to 
arbitration proceedings under the Delaware Program would prompt businesses to 
seek other arbitration forums and thereby harm the public due to the “stifling effect 
on Delaware’s efforts to ‘remain at the cutting-edge in dispute resolution,’”77 and 
Delaware’s consequent inability to compete in the international market for 
arbitration forums.78  The defendants’ brief also pointed out that there would be 
public access to any proceedings brought to challenge or confirm arbitration 
awards in the Delaware Supreme Court.79  Finally, it sought to distinguish the 
prescribed arbitration procedure from litigation.80  
Sitting by designation, Federal District Court Judge Mary McLaughlin held 
that the proceedings before the Delaware Court of Chancery were in essence civil 
trials, and therefore subject to the requirements of the First Amendment respecting 
right of access by members of the public and press.81  Judge McLaughlin’s opinion 
stressed the inherent distinctions between arbitration as a consensual “private 
system of justice” and judicial process.82  She observed that “arbitration decisions 
are ad hoc, lacking any precedential value.”83  Although arbitrators and judges 
share many characteristics, arbitrators are empowered by private agreement while 
judges are beholden to the public, and supervise “proceedings [of] a public 
character in which remedies are devised to vindicate the policies of the [law], not 
merely to afford private relief.”84  She found it significant that the defendants were 
unable to point to specific examples of judges serving as arbitrators in the ABA 
Code of Judicial Conduct.85  She also observed that sitting judges do not serve as 
arbitrators in court-connected proceedings and, indeed, are specifically prohibited 
                                                                          
72 Id. at 13 n.4.   
73 Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502.  The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
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Supp. 2d at 502. 
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81 Del Coal. for Open Gov’t, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 494. 
82 Id. at 500–01. 
83 Id. at 501. 
84 Id. at 501–02 (quoting Hutchings v. U.S. Indus. Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311–12 (5th Cir.1970)). 
85 Id. at 502. 
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from doing so by case precedents in some jurisdictions.86  She then enumerated 
certain elements of proceedings under the Delaware Arbitration Program that were 
sufficiently like trial to bring into play policies of open access, including (1) 
selection of judges as arbitrators by the Chancellor; (2) a sitting judge, paid by the 
state, presiding over a proceeding with the assistance of state personnel in public 
facilities; (3) the wielding of arbitral as well as judicial authority by the judge; and 
(4) the rendition of a final enforceable order by the judge.87   
The Chancery Court judges appealed the district court’s decision to the Third 
Circuit on October 11, 2012,88 presaging a battle that some say may continue all 
the way to the United States Supreme Court.89  Briefs filed by the parties and a 
number of amici curiae reiterated and expanded upon the arguments raised in the 
district court.90  Given the interest generated by the case and the policies involved, 
it is appropriate to look more closely at the Delaware Arbitration Program and the 
rationale of the district court.   
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE DELAWARE ARBITRATION PROGRAM AND ITS 
CONSTITUTIONALITY  
Was Federal District Court Judge Mary McLaughlin on solid ground in 
holding that the proceedings before the Delaware Court of Chancery under the 
Delaware Arbitration Program were in essence civil trials, and therefore subject to 
the requirements of the First Amendment respecting right of access by members of 
the public and the press?91  On appeal, counsel for the Delaware Chancery Court 
judges argued that the district court improperly used that conclusion to avoid 
applying the “logic and experience test” to determine “if there is a public right of 
access to a particular proceeding or record.”92  They argued that the Program 
established a framework for proceedings that included “key distinctions between 
arbitration and litigation”: a consent-based process, with decisions made “outside 
the judicial system” and “ad hoc, lacking any precedential value;” permitting 
parties to “specify the scope of the arbitrator’s authority and design the applicable 
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procedural rules;” allowing parties to “resolve disputes without aspects often 
associated with the legal system: procedural delay and cost of discovery, the 
adversarial relationship of the parties, and publicity of the dispute.”93  Because it 
established a form of arbitration, there was no public access requirement for the 
reason that “[p]roceedings before [] arbitrator[s] traditionally have been 
confidential [and] there is no history of public access.”94  They stated that to 
authorize judges to sit as arbitrators “does not transform the commercial arbitration 
proceeding into a judicial trial” because of the “settled principle that States may 
endow judges with non-judicial responsibilities.”95  The district court’s contrary 
conclusion would result in detriment not only to the State of Delaware and to 
businesses seeking effective alternatives to litigation, but to the policies supporting 
court-connected ADR programs throughout the country.96  Therefore, they 
concluded, the district court committed reversible error. 
In response, counsel for the appellee, the Delaware Coalition for Open 
Government, Inc., argued that the district court “properly ignored labels and 
looked to see whether there was a sufficiently analogous government proceeding to 
which the right of public access attaches (as opposed to practices in the private 
sector).”97  The district court properly recognized that where “a State-empowered 
judge engages in a core judicial function—hearing evidence, applying the facts to 
the law, and making binding determinations affecting the substantive legal rights 
of the parties, which determinations are immediately enforceable by the State[,] 
the . . . process is effectively a civil bench trial of commercial disputes.”98  
Therefore, the proceeding “was [properly] subject to the right of public access to 
judicial proceedings . . . .”99  Because the Delaware Arbitration Program was 
different from court-connected ADR practices in other jurisdictions, they would 
not be affected by upholding the district court’s decision.100  Neither would the 
decision cause businesses to eschew private arbitration in the U.S for foreign 
forums whose arbitrators lack the pertinent expertise in U.S. law.101  Finally, 
“[n]either Delaware’s desire to facilitate new revenue streams nor the business 
community’s desire to hide its conduct from public scrutiny justifie[d] subverting 
the First Amendment.”102 
A careful assessment of the arguments and underlying evidence, along with 
other considerations, leads to the conclusion that the district court’s decision is 
well-founded and should be upheld.  
A. The District Court’s Conclusion That the Delaware Arbitration Program 
                                                                          
93 Brief for Appellants, supra note 88, at 16–17. 
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Establishes a Privatized Version of Court Trial Appears to Be Well-
Founded 
Was the district court correct in concluding that the Delaware Arbitration 
Program was essentially a privatized court trial, and therefore subject to the public 
access requirements of the First Amendment?  Or, did the court err in subjecting a 
system of private arbitration to public access requirements merely because a sitting 
judge could be the arbitrator?   
By establishing sitting judges as the keystone of an adjudicative system that 
is effectively wholly shielded from public view through the rendition of a legally 
binding judgment, the Delaware Arbitration Program represents an unprecedented 
juxtaposition of public trial and private adjudication with no historical or current 
counterparts.  Furthermore, the only significant practical effect of the procedure—
that is, the only aspect of the procedure that is not already available to litigants in 
public trial or, alternatively, in arbitration—is to place proceedings before a sitting 
judge behind closed doors. For these reasons, the court’s conclusion appears well-
founded. 
i. The Delaware Arbitration Program represents an unprecedented 
juxtaposition of public and private adjudicative spheres 
The body of legislation and judicial decisions respecting the requirements of 
public access to judicial proceedings and “judicial documents” has played out 
against the backdrop of a struggle between those who see judicial system as a 
mechanism for problem solving and the promotion of settlement, and those who 
see it as vindicating public rights, and see litigation is a kind of public property.103  
The Delaware Arbitration Program, under which sitting publicly appointed judges 
are authorized to preside over privatized and wholly confidential proceedings, 
must be viewed against the backdrop of this body of law and the underlying policy 
dynamics.   
Although the law of public access that developed in various ways in different 
jurisdictions,104 that body of law generally reflects a kind of balancing between the 
“problem-solving” and “public rights” approaches105 in that it recognizes that 
different forms of litigation and different elements of the litigation process present 
stronger or weaker bases for public access depending on historical and functional 
factors.106  Among functional factors affecting public access to elements of civil 
litigation, a key factor appears to be the proximity of the element to the core 
judicial function.107  The argument for public access to a court-related proceeding 
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or to documents is least powerful when the latter are furthest removed from core 
judicial functions,108 as in discovery109 and settlement-oriented activities.110  
Conversely, it is most powerful within the purview of core judicial functions such 
as adjudication of a case on the merits;111 here, proponents of the “public rights” 
approach say there must be public access.112  To the extent that confidentiality 
serves to promote collaborative activities that facilitate the settlement of litigated 
disputes, then, some argue that it serves to conserve judicial resources.113  Such 
arguments are naturally weakest when public access is sought to court trial. 
 Private binding arbitration is a wholly different realm.  It is a thing apart, 
founded on private agreement, and fundamentally depended on the choices made 
by the private parties.114  The Federal Arbitration Act and state arbitration statutes 
tend to carefully demarcate the interface between arbitration and the courts which 
are sometimes called upon to facilitate arbitration processes by enforcing 
arbitration agreements, appointing arbitrators, enforcing subpoenas, and 
confirming, modifying or vacating awards.115  As a thing apart, arbitration is not 
touched by the law of public access as it affects public judicial proceedings.116  
Arbitration proceedings are generally conducted in private,117 and arbitrating 
parties sometimes enhance the protections surrounding arbitration by entering into 
agreements for confidentiality.118 
When arbitrating parties seek to avail themselves of the assistance of a judge, 
however, they potentially fall within the ambit of public access law.  As observed 
in a recent federal court decision, “while parties to an arbitration are generally 
‘permitted to keep their private undertakings from the prying eyes of others,’ the 
‘circumstance changes when a party seeks to enforce in federal court the fruits of 
their private agreement to arbitration, i.e. the arbitration award.’”119  Thus, when 
arbitrating parties seek the sanction of courts for arbitration awards, those awards 
and related pleadings may be considered “judicial documents” because of their 
relevance to the decision of a court to confirm or vacate an arbitration award.120  
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In recent years, the bright line between arbitration and litigation has in some 
respects blurred as arbitration has taken on many more of the vestiges of litigation 
in a public forum.121  Today, arbitrators handle virtually any kind of civil claim or 
controversy, including even antitrust122 and discrimination123 claims and other 
statutory causes of action.  Arbitration proceedings frequently bear close 
resemblance to civil litigation,124 and may even result in the imposition of socially 
exemplary remedies such as punitive damages or statutory damages.125  There are 
arbitration agreements that call for arbitrator appointments to be made by courts;126 
this is, in fact, the default resolution under federal and state statutes when the 
appointment mechanism established by the parties, if any, fails of its intended 
purpose.127  And although the Supreme Court has indicated that parties may not 
contractually expand the limited statutory bases for judicial vacatur of arbitration 
awards under the Federal Arbitration Act,128 it is now possible in a few 
jurisdictions to create a kind of public/private hybrid procedure by means of a 
contractual provision for judicial review of arbitration awards for errors of law or 
fact.129 
There is also no question that, practically speaking, public access to the 
elements of civil trial is not unlimited, and judges engage in activities that are not 
strictly adjudicative and which may occur beyond the public purview.  Trial judges 
sometimes conduct private settlement conferences in which they encourage, cajole 
and browbeat parties into a negotiated resolution.130  Moreover, they may employ 
and occasionally even participate in relatively confidential court-connected ADR 
processes aimed at encouraging pre-trial settlement of disputes.131  They may also 
have occasion to seal court records to assure protection from the prying eyes of 
competitors and other third parties.132 
There remains, however, an essential, meaningful dividing line between 
public courts and private binding arbitration.  Again, when arbitrating parties avail 
themselves of the court system before, during or after the process, as stated above, 
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they open themselves to greater scrutiny.  A motion to confirm or vacate an 
arbitration award creates the possibility that the rights of access of third parties to 
court proceedings and related documents may entail a loss or diminishing of the 
confidentiality experienced by the parties in arbitration.133  To establish a class of 
arbitration that is subject to a general requirement of confidentiality and is presided 
over by a sitting judge appears to represent a dramatic departure from this reality.  
This brings us to the argument made by proponents of the Delaware 
Arbitration that arbitration has been regularly employed as one of the ADR options 
in court-connected programs.134  They assert that such proceedings are sometimes 
treated as confidential,135 and, furthermore, may be presided over by sitting 
judges.136   
On close examination, however, the precedents cited are not equivalent to 
traditional binding arbitration.137  The practical reality is that court-connected 
arbitration proceedings do not automatically produce a binding arbitration award, 
since any party has the right to request trial de novo for a period after the rendition 
of an award.138  Nonbinding court-connected arbitration proceedings are usually 
abbreviated processes aimed at promoting a negotiated resolution short of trial, and 
may be limited in application to cases below a certain dollar value.139  Aside from 
distant historical examples, the defendants’ brief at trial offered no specific 
examples of actual proceedings in which sitting judges were appointed as 
arbitrators in private, binding arbitration proceedings resulting in an enforceable 
judgment, as here.140  And although, as stated above, their appellate brief purported 
to offer such examples, the appellee’s brief demonstrated that all of these programs 
appear to be of the standard court-connected nonbinding variety described 
above.141   
Thus, the Delaware Arbitration Program represents a significant leap beyond 
any other venture along the borderline between public and private adjudicative 
forums.  Research has thus far failed to uncover any other scheme remotely like it. 
Moreover, as Judge McLaughlin observed, some courts have ruled that 
because of inherent conflicts between the two roles sitting judges should not serve 
as arbitrators.142  Relatively few published decisions have addressed situations 
where sitting judges have allowed themselves to be fashioned as arbitrators.143  In 
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such cases, the usual result is expressions of doubt or incredulity by appellate 
courts who find themselves in the position of trying to salvage the situation by re-
casting the “arbitration award” as a court judgment.144  The most prominent of 
these decisions is DDI Seamless Cylinder International, Inc. v. General Fire 
Extinguisher Corp.,145 in which Judge Richard Posner concluded that an agreement 
purporting to arbitrate a contract action before a federal magistrate would be 
treated as “an abbreviated, informal procedure for [the magistrate’s] deciding the 
case in his judicial capacity.”146  This was necessary in order to prevent the 
magistrate’s decision from being deemed ultra vires, since “arbitration is not in the 
job description of a federal judge, including . . . a magistrate judge . . . . Federal 
statutes authorizing arbitration . . . do not appear to authorize or envisage the 
appointment of judges or magistrate judges as arbitrators.” 147   
Posner’s decision was approvingly cited at length in a decision of the District 
of Delaware, Hameli v. Nazario,148 in which the court was also confronted with the 
question of the legal effect of a decision by a federal magistrate under a purported 
agreement to arbitrate.  In Hameli, the court avoided having to directly address the 
efficacy of the purported agreement on the basis that the magistrate lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the issues in dispute.  In a footnote, however, the court 
observed that under the Civil Justice Reform Act,149 which laid the groundwork for 
court-connected ADR programs throughout the federal system, “the magistrate 
judge has played an ever increasing part in settlement negotiations . . . .”150  The 
court noted that its own local rule, moreover, authorized magistrates “to ‘[c]onduct 
various alternative dispute resolution processes, including but not limited to judge-
hosted settlement conferences, mediation, arbitration, early neutral evaluation, and 
summary trials (jury and nonjury).”151  It was evident, therefore, that magistrate 
judges “assume a variety of roles in the course of aiding the district court . . . 
including those of mediator and adjudicator.” 152  Importantly, however, the court 
did not go so far as to state that magistrates could not only adjudicate, but could 
serve as arbitrators under private contracts calling for binding arbitration.  To do so 
would have been inconsistent with practices in federal courts around the country153 
and, most likely, contrary to practices under the cited local court ADR rule quoted 
above.154  The latter lists the term “arbitration” in the context of a range of 
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processes (settlement conferences, mediation, early neutral evaluation, and 
summary trials) employed in federal court ADR programs in order to foster 
settlement among litigating parties, but not imposing final and binding third-party 
decisions.155  As an element in the array of procedural tools employed by courts to 
settle cases short of trial, participation in nonbinding arbitration may be required 
by courts even in the absence of party consent.156  This imposition on the right to 
trial is deemed acceptable because, as discussed above, such arbitrations are 
typically abbreviated proceedings which are nonbinding in the absence of a post-
hearing agreement, and give parties the option of pursuing a trial de novo.157  This 
kind of “arbitration” is, again, a very different species from the contractual, legally 
binding variety furthered by the Federal Arbitration Act and parallel state statutes, 
and knowledgeable courts, practitioners and scholars are careful to distinguish the 
two.158   
This fundamental dichotomy between court-connected nonbinding arbitration 
and contract-based binding arbitration was noted by a California appellate court in 
Heenan v. Sobati, which found “judicial binding arbitration by a sitting judge” to 
be an oxymoron under California law.159  The court observed that California law 
establishes two “mutually exclusive and independent” statutory schemes: “judicial 
arbitration,” which involves nonbinding decisions and the right to a trial de 
novo,160 and “contractual arbitration,” which “takes place outside the legal system 
without any expectation of further contact with the courts,”161 “a private 
proceeding, arranged by contract, without legal compulsion.”162  The Heenan court 
then proceeded to offer a rationale why sitting judges have no business presiding 
over binding contractual arbitration; significantly, it hinged on the fundamentally 
divergent policies respecting the privacy and confidentiality of court trial and 
arbitration: 
Public judging operates in the public eye, with reported proceedings and under 
appellate review, to both dispense justice and “satisfy the appearance of justice.”. . . 
These distinctions blur if sitting judges, their salaries paid by the state, conduct 
private, binding arbitrations in the public’s courthouses – shielded from the need to 
follow established rules of law or to justify their decisions by reason, evidence and 
precedent.163   
 The Delaware Arbitration Program is an unprecedented experiment that 
intermingles, among other things, what is indisputably the core judicial function—
adjudication of the merits of a dispute—and traditional binding arbitration.  It thus 
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takes the central activity of public judges, that which presents the most compelling 
of claims for public access, and cloaks it in an enveloping mantle of confidentiality 
under the rubric of “arbitration.”  This is in contrast to settlement-oriented 
activities which offer less compelling arguments for public access, including the 
range of court-connected ADR programs including nonbinding arbitration.  As we 
will see, however, despite the difference in labels, the only fundamental element of 
this program that is not already available to parties is the confidentiality pervading 
the scheme. 
ii. The key distinguishing element of the Delaware Arbitration 
Program is the placement of proceedings before a sitting judge 
behind closed doors 
While it is not unheard of for judges to make arbitral appointments pursuant 
to a contract,164 this appears to be the first reported scheme where all appointments 
are made by the Chancellor, the appointees are sitting judges, and the judges are 
empowered to render final and binding arbitration awards in private proceedings.  
Normal arbitrators lack certain powers of courts, including the contempt power, 
and therefore parties are required to seek the assistance of courts in enforcing 
arbitral orders.165  Here, because the arbitrators are also judges, they are at least 
arguably in a position not only to offer preliminary and final relief in the manner of 
normal arbitrators, but also to wield coercive power for the purpose of enforcing 
the orders they frame.166  That said, however, there is language in the 
implementing Chancery Court Rules that seems to indicate that many of the 
enforcement-related activities that would ordinarily be within the authority of 
Chancery judges are instead delegated to the Delaware Supreme Court in a manner 
analogous to ordinary arbitration.167   
Nevertheless, in one respect the Delaware Arbitration Program seemingly 
makes a significant departure from the model of an analogue to traditional private 
binding arbitration.  This occurs at the end of the proceeding, when under the 
procedures of the Program the conversion of an arbitration award to a court 
judgment is apparently automatic.168  This is a highly distinctive and critically 
important aspect of the procedure, because it apparently obviates the need for 
parties to act affirmatively to obtain the benefits associated with converting an 
arbitration award to a court judgment, such as being able to make use of public 
enforcement mechanisms against a losing party as debtor.  In traditional 
arbitration, as discussed above, the act of seeking judicial confirmation is a public 
act, and may open some elements of the proceeding to third party access.169  Not 
so with the Delaware procedure.  From the inception of the proceeding until the 
docketing of a court judgment, the public record is non-existent or de minimus.   
What, after all, does the Delaware Arbitration Program offer businesses that 
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they did not have before, since they could already count on highly knowledgeable 
adjudicators and the promise of a relatively quick and efficient process in regular 
court proceedings, and since proceedings (including discovery, motion practice 
and conduct of hearings) will probably be substantially similar in either forum?  
(Again, it is well understood that today, commercial arbitration often replicates 
many of the features of court litigation; one would expect this to be especially so 
where the parties have opted for a proceeding conducted by a sitting judge.)  True, 
the Program affords parties the opportunity to have Chancery judge/arbitrators 
address bare claims for damages (as opposed to equitable relief) and to have the 
judge/arbitrators act as mediators, but neither of these alone, arguably, would be a 
significant draw.  In the category of novel, heretofore unrealized benefits there 
appears to be only one key element—the opportunity to conduct hearings before a 
sitting judge behind closed doors, and to cloak the proceeding—including its very 
existence—in secrecy from filing to the automatic docketing of a court judgment.  
This, more than any other fact, supports the district court’s conclusion that this is 
really court trial by another name.  
B. As a Matter of Practice and Policy, Denying Enforcement to the Program 
is Unlikely to Have Negative Consequences, While Enforcement May 
Produce Negative Consequences 
Does it make a difference as a matter of policy and practice whether or not 
Delaware is permitted to sponsor a private arbitration program in which the 
arbitrators are sitting Chancery Court judges?  The proponents of the Delaware 
Arbitration Program argue that striking down the program will work to the 
detriment of the State of Delaware, harm businesses and undermine court-
connected ADR programs.170  The challengers respond that no harm will be done 
to the broad run of court-connected ADR, since other programs are fundamentally 
different from the Delaware scheme; furthermore, harm to Delaware’s coffers or 
business interests should be given no weight in contravention of First Amendment 
concerns.171   
Denying enforcement to this particular scheme is unlikely to deal a body 
blow to the aspirations of Delaware to enhance its image as the go-to forum for 
businesses or to greatly impair the ability of businesses to find favorable 
adjudicative forums.  Neither would it in any way hamper the ability of courts 
around the country to develop and maintain highly effective ADR programs.   
On the other hand, upholding the Delaware Arbitration Program could have 
negative consequences.  A precedent for privatizing court-based, judge-supervised 
arbitrations would be a major step in the direction of undermining the role of 
courts as public institutions and systems of precedent.  It may also blur the 
boundary between private binding arbitration and public adjudication.   
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i. Striking down the Delaware Arbitration Program is unlikely to 
produce significant negative consequences  
a. Impact on Delaware 
 
It is doubtful that the loss of the Delaware Arbitration Program, which has 
thus far achieved marginal uptake, will imperil Delaware’s position as a favorable 
business forum.  While Delaware may not find itself among leading international 
“arbitration destinations” (if that was ever a likely outcome of this experiment), its 
courts can still craft law favorable to private arbitration.  Meanwhile, instead of 
moving a portion of their activities to the sphere of purely private adjudication, the 
judges of Chancery will continue to perform their judicial duties in the traditional 
fashion, rendering decisions that continue to build on body of public precedents 
that have characterized and distinguished Delaware jurisprudence.  
The greatest loss to Delaware may be the revenue that might otherwise have 
entered its coffers had more businesses purchased Delaware charters to avail 
themselves of the Arbitration Program.  One is tempted to suggest that if revenues 
are an issue, as they so often are for courts today, perhaps consideration should be 
given to making frequent users pay a heavier share of the burden of providing a 
public justice system, a burden now borne overwhelmingly by taxpayers.172  
However, the Program’s proponents might argue that without the carrot 
represented by the ultra-private arbitration system, charging business parties a 
premium for using the Chancery Court might actually put Delaware at a 
competitive disadvantage until jurisdictions around the country start charging 
frequent users more of the real cost of litigation. 
b. Impact on businesses 
 
As discussed in Part II above, from the standpoint of businesses the 
Delaware Arbitration Program offers a particularly advantageous procedural 
framework for the resolution of disputes.  It is, however, by no means the only way 
of accomplishing important business goals and addressing key business concerns 
in arbitration.  While arbitration before a sitting judge may be problematic, similar 
benefits may be obtained in purely private arbitration proceedings with some 
degree of planning.  Businesses already have the ability to elect to use arbitration 
procedures that afford a high degree of privacy and confidentiality, including 
procedures specifically tailored for protection of intellectual property.173   
There are also other ways of dealing with concerns about arbitrator decision-
making and application of legal principles.174  Among other things, parties could 
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choose a retired Chancery court judge as their arbitrator.  The same may be said of 
concerns about promoting efficiency and economy in arbitration.  Options exist for 
the taking, and much time and effort has been devoted in recent years to providing 
parties with the opportunity to make choices aimed at these goals.175  As long as 
the determination reached by the Third Circuit is limited to the unique set of 
circumstances inhering in the Delaware program, a decision denying enforcement 
to the Delaware Arbitration Program should not seriously affect the ability of 
businesses to achieve their legitimate ends through private arbitration.  
c. Impact on court-connected ADR programs 
 
  Finally, for the reasons discussed above, declining to enforce the Delaware 
Arbitration Program will have absolutely no effect on the wide range of ADR 
programs around the country.176  Because the Delaware Program is anomalous, its 
non-enforcement is no precedent for judicial enforcement of the broad run of 
nonbinding arbitration programs and other procedures, all of which are aimed at 
facilitating the achievement of settlements short of court trial.  
ii. Upholding the Delaware Arbitration Program may have negative 
consequences 
On the other hand, should the Delaware Arbitration Program ultimately be 
upheld, one could envision potentially significant consequences for courts and for 
the general public.  Once court-sponsored private arbitration receives judicial 
imprimatur, it is reasonable to expect courts around the country to begin offering 
such services, and to expect businesses to embrace these options and pay a 
premium (if the forum and the tribunal are otherwise acceptable) as a convenient 
way of avoiding the public glare of trial and wrapping the entire proceeding in a 
cloak of confidentiality.   
Besides severely limiting public access to proceedings in the courthouse, 
moreover, this activity could bring us measurably closer to the kind of scenario 
long envisioned by those who have argued that the rise of private dispute 
resolution (especially binding arbitration) will undermine the public justice system 
by curtailing the publication of decisional precedents.177  The Delaware Arbitration 
Program affords parties the opportunity to move court-supervised proceedings 
from the public docket (and the system of public precedents) directly into a private 
and precedent-less netherworld.  The potential impact on the public justice system 
is surely as direct and significant than any form of private or public ADR devised 
to date, or more so.  
Moreover, business interests, some of whom have filed briefs in support of 
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the Delaware Arbitration Program,178 should seriously reflect on the advisability of 
further intermingling private arbitration with the public forum.  Today, consensual 
binding arbitration affords parties considerable room to structure private and 
confidential dispute resolution proceedings, in contrast to the presumptively public 
forum of litigation.  If the boundaries between these spheres become increasingly 
fuzzy, even traditional binding arbitration may become less private.  As a 
California appellate court observed in the course of expressing concerns about 
litigants refining arbitration to produce “incoherent hybrids”: “[those] who fashion 
such variants should be forewarned that the primary governing law may be the law 
of unintended consequences.”179   
V. CONCLUSION 
The Delaware Arbitration Program may have been designed as a way of 
achieving a veritable arbitration trifecta: (1) a first-rate adjudicator practiced at 
applying the law to complex factual scenarios, (2) efficient case management and 
short cycle time and (3) a proceeding cloaked in secrecy.  On closer analysis, 
however, the Program appears to establish a proceeding that is in essence litigation 
behind closed doors.   
By establishing sitting judges as the keystone of an adjudicative system that 
is privatized and presumptively confidential through the rendition of a legally 
binding judgment, the Delaware Arbitration Program creates an unprecedented 
juxtaposition of public trial and private adjudication, an anomaly that has no 
counterparts.  The only significant element of the procedure that is not already 
available to litigants in public trial or, alternatively, in arbitration—is the 
placement of proceedings before a sitting judge behind closed doors. For these 
reasons, the court’s conclusion appears well-founded. 
It is highly doubtful that the loss of the Delaware Arbitration Program will 
imperil Delaware’s position as a favorable business forum.  Moreover, it will not 
prevent businesses from structuring effective, appropriate, and confidential 
arbitration procedures, nor will it undermine the ability of courts to develop and 
maintain a wide variety of court-connected ADR programs.  If the Delaware 
Arbitration Program were upheld, however, the precedent might work tangibly to 
the detriment of the public justice system by encouraging businesses to opt out of 
public adjudication, with public judges rendering private decisions that are off the 
public roles, thereby negatively impacting our system of public precedents.  It 
might also blur the boundaries between private binding arbitration and public trial, 
producing other unintended consequences. 
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